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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyze the intersections of legal and political dispute
resolution methods in Arctic territorial disputes involving Russia and several
Western governments, including Canada and the United States. There are two
current disputes. The first dispute concentrates on the Lomonosov Ridge, a
geological feature that runs near the North Pole and has been used by three
states to claim the North Pole as part of their continental shelf. The second
dispute deals with the legal status of the Northern Sea Route. Our paper
evaluates the tradeoffs between the legal and political constraints in these
disputes between Russia and the West, and considers the possible methods of
dispute settlement. In the paper, we suggest that the resolution of Arctic
conflicts is likely to include a set of legal-political equilibria, such as
international adjudication, voluntary mediation, and intergovernmental
regulation. The Lomonosov Ridge dispute is likely to be resolved by voluntary
mediation through a voluntary conciliation procedure coupled with the
political support of Russia, Denmark, and Canada. However, the Northern
Sea Route dispute is likely to be addressed by intergovernmental regulation
because Russia’s argument on coastal jurisdiction is opposed by that of the
United States on international waters and the right to free navigation.
INTRODUCTION
The Arctic is a territory of cooperation and conflict. Five states border
the Arctic Ocean – Russia and four NATO members: Norway, Denmark
(Greenland), Canada, and the United States. Conflicts, actual and potential,
abound, some concern natural resources, while others concern shipping,
military presence, and state boundaries.1 The receding ice due to climate
change exacerbates these issues.2 The primary rivalry underlying these
disputes is between Russia and the Western Arctic states.3 The main challenge
to resolving this set of conflicts is that there is neither a unified Arctic law,
nor is there a primary dispute resolution process.4 In this paper, we focus on
the analysis of two pending disputes, the Lomonosov Ridge dispute and the
Northern Sea Route dispute. The Lomonosov Ridge is a maritime feature that
the disputing parties claim as an extension of their continental shelves, and
1

Spencer Cook, Potential for Conflict in the Arctic: The New Cold War?, STORY MAPS
(July 17, 2020),
https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/a19b6a79bc5c4596b52531856af389c9/print.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Zhao Long, Arctic Governance, COUNCIL ON F OREIGN RELS. (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.cfr.org/report/arctic-governance.
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the Northern Sea Route is a shipping route to which Russia lays claim, though
the United States disputes that claim.5
Is there a legal path for the resolution of these disputes? Resolving
sensitive security questions in a courtroom could lead to increased tensions,
and, as noted by the former head of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (ITLOS), the expectation that a court can itself secure peace may be
unrealistic.6 On the other hand, political regulation may respond to the
readiness of diplomatic and military options, which could facilitate an
unsustainable legal-political equilibrium.7 Our analysis focuses on the
tradeoffs between legal adjudication and political regulation. After we
examine the differences between judicial and diplomatic methods, we explore
the possibilities of combining judicial and extra-judicial resolution methods.
We propose that there is no universal panacea, but that different combinations
of these methods can resolve different disputes.
In Part I, we discuss the norms, concepts, and procedures of
international law that govern the logic of Arctic conflicts. International law
regulates ownership of natural resources, governing access to and control over
them through territorial or jurisdictional rights.8 We discuss the role of
maritime zones, straight baselines, the extension of the continental shelf,
maritime boundaries, the status of straits, and navigation rights. Our paper
also examines the dispute resolution framework provided by the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other institutions that may
play a role in these conflicts, such as the Arctic Council and the various courts
and tribunals that may have the jurisdiction to hear cases related to these
disputes. The latter include the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas (ITLOS), and arbitration
tribunals and conciliation commissions, which usually are administered by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). We summarize a selection of relevant
cases to show how international adjudication may decide these two disputes.
We then compare the effectiveness of legal and political constraints.
In Part II, we discuss the strategies of the five Arctic states, focusing
particularly on Russian foreign policy. Strategy documents and disputes with
Russian involvement are used to show how the Kremlin defines its position in
related events. We identify which dispute resolution mechanism has the
5

David Auerswald, Commentary, Now Is Not the Time for a Fonop in the Arctic, WAR ON
THE ROCKS (Oct. 11, 2019), https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/now-is-not-the-time-fora-fonop-in-the-arctic/.
6
Marc Engelhardt, Law of the Sea in the Strait of Hormuz, DEUTSCHLANDFUNK (Oct. 08,
2019), https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/seerecht-in-der-strasse-von-hormus-das-ringenum-die.724.de.html?dram:article_id=460555.
7 See id.
8 Richard B. Bilder, International Law and Natural Resources Policies, 20 NAT. RES. J.
451, 452 (1981).
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highest chance of success given Russia’s international legal and foreign policy
behavior. In Parts III and IV, we elaborate on the two Arctic disputes: the
Lomonosov Ridge and the Northern Sea Route. Russia, Denmark, and Canada
have provided expert arguments on why the Lomonosov Ridge is part of their
continental shelf in their submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The Russian government views the Northern
Sea Route as a historic waterway over which it can exert its sovereignty. 9 It
has established a regime, which holds that vessels traversing the route require
a Russian icebreaker accompaniment.10 The United States views this as an
infringement on the freedom of navigation.11 In Part V, we explain the degree
to which legal-political equilibria can resolve these conflicts.
I.

BACKGROUND

There are several sources of Arctic law. The Bering Strait, the body
of water between Eastern Russia and Alaska, is governed by nearly 160 legal
acts from the local level in Russia and the US to the international level.12 The
international law applicable in the Arctic is composed of hard law, which
includes international agreements like UNCLOS and the rulings of
international courts.13 This is complemented by international soft law, which
includes non-binding agreements and forums, such as the Arctic Council.14
Relevant sources beyond the scope of this paper include the national law of
the Arctic states as well as private and transboundary laws, which may apply
to contracts between states and companies.15
International law provides limits to how states can exercise their
power.16 As there is no international law enforcement, states need to accept
the agreed upon or customary international law for it to work – this has been
called the “Achilles’ heel” of international law.17 Generally, states adhere to

9

See Sean Fahey, Access Control: Freedom of the Seas in the Arctic and the Russian
Northern Sea Route Regime, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 154, 170 (2018).
10 Id. at 169.
11 Id. at 162.
12 See Paul A. Berkman et al., Governing the Bering Strait Region: Current Status,
Emerging Issues and Future Options, 47 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 186, 190 (2016).
13 See Edward Canuel, The Four Arctic Law Pillars: A Legal Framework, 46 GEO J. &
INT’L L. 735, 739 (2015).
14 See id. at 744; Christian Tomuschat, Effectiveness and Legitimacy in International Law,
77 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 309, 311 (2017).
15 See Canuel, supra note 13, at 739.
16 Bjarni Mar Magnusson & Charles H. Norchi, Geopolitics and International Law in the
Arctic, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ARCTIC SECURITY 246, 247 (Gunhild Hoogensen
Gjørv, Marc Lanteigne & Horatio Sam-Aggrey eds., 2020); Canuel, supra note 13, at 739.
17 Tomuschat, supra note 114, at 310.
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international law when it serves their national interest.18 These interests range
from taking advantage of the broad maritime claims UNCLOS allows, to
preserving various resources by not having to negotiate the same issues
repeatedly.19 Adherence to international law can also prevent states from
appearing unjust before their domestic audience or the international
community.20 Some transgressions, like those in environmental law, have
transboundary consequences.21 Hence, states may want to avoid this, leading
to acceptance of such regulations. Furthermore, some states that have joined
international agreements voluntarily participated in their drafting and have
been encouraged to comply with agreement due to reciprocity.22
Prior research has concentrated on the legal architecture of the Arctic,
drawing together acts of law and creating legal guidebooks on specialist
issues, such as oil and gas development in the Arctic,23 or access to the Arctic
by non-Arctic actors.24 All of these refer to the most comprehensive
agreement for matters related to oceans: UNCLOS, to which all Arctic states,
except for the United States, are party.25 However, it is generally agreed that
the United States accepts most of UNCLOS as customary law.26 UNCLOS
incorporated the 1958 conventions on the High Seas, the Continental Shelf,
and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, while
regulating a wide range of topics, among them fisheries, shipping, piracy,
marine environment, oil spills, and maritime boundaries.27 The Arctic states
underscored that they accepted the applicability of international law to the
Arctic in the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008:
18

See Magnusson & Norchi, supra note 116, at 247; Canuel, supra note 13, at 739.
Andreas Østhagen, A Divided Arctic: Maritime Boundary Agreements
and Disputes in the Arctic Ocean, in HANDBOOK ON GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY IN THE
ARCTIC 171, 175 (Joachim Weber ed., 2020); Canuel, supra note 13, at 739.
20 See Mortimer Sellers, The Effectiveness of International Law, in REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES
IN INTERNATIONAL L AW 52, 52 (2006); ROBERT KOLB, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
243 (2016).
21 Donald R. Rothwell, International Law and the Protection of the Arctic Environment,
44:2 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. Apr., 1995 at 280.
22 KOLB, supra note 20, at 242.
23 See generally RACHAEL LORNA JOHNSTONE, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN
THE ARCTIC UNDER I NTERNATIONAL L AW: R ISK AND RESPONSIBILITY (Malgosia Fitzmaurice
et al. eds., 2015).
24 See generally TIMO KOIVUROVA ET AL., ARCTIC LAW AND G OVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF
CHINA, FINLAND, AND THE EU (Timo Koivurova et al. eds., 2017); AKIHO SHIBATA ET AL.,
EMERGING LEGAL ORDERS IN THE ARCTIC: THE ROLE OF NON-ARCTIC Actors (Akiho
Shibata et al. eds., 2019).
25 See John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: Sliding Back
from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 2 (2005).
26 See id. at 10.
27 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Preamble, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
19 Clive Schofield &
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[W]e recall that an extensive international legal framework
applies to the Arctic Ocean as discussed between our
representatives at the meeting in Oslo on 15 and 16 October
2007 at the level of senior officials. Notably, the law of the
sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning
the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the
protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered
areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and
other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal
framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible
overlapping claims.28
A. Maritime Zones
Beyond a state’s coast lay waters governed under a number of
different rights and regulations, such as the regime of territorial waters and
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).29 The two Arctic disputes that we
Klaus Dodds, The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, “Law of the Sea,” and
the Arctic Ocean, 33 SAIS REV. INT’L AFF. 45, 49–50 (2013).
29 In addition to territorial waters or the contiguous zone, a state can extend its sovereignty
over water areas up to 200 nm from the baseline: the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. The continental margin “comprises the submerged
prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil
of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic
ridges or the subsoil thereof.” Id. art. 76(3). In this area, the coastal state can exploit or
conserve living and non-living resources – for example fish and oil and gas. Id. art. 56. The
EEZ is a concept that was first created by UNCLOS. According to UNCLOS, a state can
also claim the area beyond 200 nm, (usually up to 350 nm, or to 100 nm from the 2,500mile isobath – a line that connects the depth of 2,500 meters) if the state can prove that its
continental shelf extends that far. Id. art. 76. There are two ways in which a state can do
this: (i) by referring to the thickness of sedimentary rocks or (ii) in reference to fixed points
from the continental slope. Id. art. 76(4). States must submit their grounds for their claims
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which is constituted according
to UNCLOS Annex II. Id. art. 76(8). These applications must be backed up with geographic
and geological evidence. However, the legal and the geologic continental shelf can differ.
Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Lomonosov Ridge, in 19 CTR. FOR OCEANS L.
AND POL’Y 42, 44 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2016). What a state receives is the right
to access the resources. Other rights, such as freedom of navigation, remain available for
foreign vessels. Id. art. 38(2). Beyond the EEZ and the extended continental shelf are the
high seas and the Area. UNCLOS Article 86 holds that the high seas are all parts of the sea
that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal
waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state. They are free for
use by all states, UNCLOS, art. 87(1), which means all states can freely navigate and fly
over, but also fish, lay underwater cables or construct artificial islands in the high seas. The
Area is defined as the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, and is beyond the limits
28
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analyze in this paper involve questions of ownership and sovereignty over
water areas and the seafloor. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea holds
that a coastal state’s sovereignty extends beyond the landmass and internal
water, meaning its sovereignty extends also over the “territorial sea”,
including the seabed and subsoil as well as the airspace above. 30 The territorial
sea can be established to a breadth of up to 12 nautical miles (nm) from a
state’s “baselines”,31 which are defined as the “low-water line along the
coast”.32 A state’s “contiguous zone” can extend up to 24 nm, wherein the
coastal state may exert control to prevent infringements of its customs, fiscal,
sanitation, or immigration laws and regulations.33
Regarding baselines, UNCLOS provides that states can draw straight
baselines joining “appropriate points” where the coastline is deeply indented
or cut into.34 If applied, this increases the area of territorial waters as well as
any related areas, over which the state can exercise sovereignty and bring
economic benefits.35 Some states argue that use of straight baselines has
become “excessive.”36 There is evidence that eighty states have drawn straight
baselines since 1951.37 In the Arctic, only the United States has not followed
that practice.38
B. Boundary Delimitations
UNCLOS provides how boundaries are delimited; relevant concepts
here include baselines, the equidistance line, and equity.39 UNCLOS
of national jurisdiction. Id. art. 1(1)(1). Rather than being free for all, UNCLOS established
the International Seabed Authority (ISA), headquartered in Jamaica, to manage access to
seabed resources such as oil, gas and rare earths. Id. art. 156. This provision constitutes a
compromise between coastal states and states without seashores. Coastal states wanted to
extend the area they had control over and expand access to seabed resources, while the
other states wanted to maximize the Area – the common heritage of mankind. Byers, supra
note 29, at 45. Granting coastal states special rights but also providing pathways to
resources for non-coastal states makes participating states more likely to uphold the
Convention, as they benefit from it. See id.
30 UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 2.
31 Id. art. 3.
32 Id. art. 5.
33 Id. art. 33.
34 Id. art. 7 (1).
35 See Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, State Practices of Straight Baselines Institute Excessive
Maritime Claims, 42 S. ILL. U. L. J. 421-422 (2018).
36
Id. at 422.
37 W. MICHAEL REISMAN & GAYL S. WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES IN INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 105, 105 (1992).
38 Tullio Scovazzi, Sovereignty over Land and Sea in the Arctic, 34 AGENDA
INTERNACIONAL 169, 172 (2016) (Peru).
39 UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 9.
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provisions differ depending on the maritime zone in which the boundary is to
be drawn: territorial waters, EEZ, or the continental shelf.40 UNCLOS Article
74 holds that boundaries in the EEZ should also be delimited by an
international agreement (1). If no agreement can be reached in a reasonable
time, parties can refer the dispute to compulsory dispute settlement procedures
as set out in UNCLOS Part XV (2). While a boundary agreement is being
negotiated, the states should come to a provisional agreement for practical
purposes, and not hamper the reaching of a final agreement (3). Any questions
about the delimitation should be determined in accordance with the agreement
(4). With regard to the continental shelf, delimitation should be carried out in
the same manner as in the EEZ (UNCLOS Art. 83).41
The concept of the equidistance boundary line is a delimitation
concept that stems back to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. 42 Since then,
it has come under criticism as it led to “unreasonable” results; for example,
where the coast of one state is concave and the other is convex. In the North
Sea Continental Shelf Case from 1969 (the first international court case for
the maritime boundary delimitation) the ICJ stated: “It must next be observed
that, in certain geographical circumstances which are quite frequently met
with, the equidistance method, despite its known advantages, leads
unquestionably to inequity . . . .”43 Although the ICJ has stated that it is neither
customary international law to apply it, nor that the method of equidistance is
privileged in relation to other methods, it is often used as a starting point in
negotiations and arbitrations.44 This is called the equidistance/relevant
circumstances method and involves the equidistance line being drawn as a
provisional line, and adjusted or shifted if relevant circumstances exist:
In the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area
between Greenland and Jan Mayen, the ICJ expressly
articulated the approach of dividing the delimitation process
into two stages, namely “to begin with the median line as a
provisional line and then to ask whether ‘special
circumstances’ require any adjustment or shifting of that
A maritime boundary in the territorial seas between two states’ adjacent or opposite
coasts should be delimited by agreement. See ALINA KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (2015). If it is not, according to UNCLOS Article 15, the limit
for one state’s territorial waters should be drawn at the equidistance line between the
baselines of the two, which makes it the median line. This does not apply where historic
titles or special circumstances provide for a different way of delimitation.
41
UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 74.
42 See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 12, Apr. 29, 1958,
516 U.N.T.S. 205.
43 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 89 (Feb. 20).
44 NUGZAR DUNDUA, DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ADJACENT
STATES 16, (2007).
40
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line” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, at p. 61, para.
51). This general approach has proven to be suitable for use
in most of the subsequent judicial and arbitral delimitations.
As developed in those cases, it has come to be known as the
equidistance/relevant circumstances method.45
The merits of the equidistance line are that its application is scientific and,
therefore, relatively easy.46 One survey of ICJ delimitation rulings found that,
while the ICJ maintains the equidistance line is not the preferred method, it
nevertheless most often decides on boundaries drawn using the equidistance
line: “States who submit their disputes to the Court may well expect that this
is the method that would be applied by the Court in delimiting their
boundaries.”47
Another method that is sometimes invoked is the angle-bisector
method. This was applied by the ICJ in several maritime boundary cases,
including the 1982 Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya case,48 1984 Gulf of
Maine case,49 and 2007 Nicaragua v. Honduras case.50 In the third case, the
ICJ stated:
The use of a bisector — the line formed by bisecting the
angle created by the linear approximations of coastlines —
has proved to be a viable substitute method in certain
circumstances where equidistance is not possible or
appropriate. The justification for the application of the
bisector method in maritime delimitation lies in the
configuration of and relationship between the relevant
coastal fronts and the maritime areas to be delimited. In
instances where, as in the present case, any base points that
could be determined by the Court are inherently unstable, the
bisector method may be seen as an approximation of the
equidistance method.51

45

Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case
No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 4, ¶ 229.
46 See DUNDUA, supra note 44, at 24.
47 Fayokemi Olorundami, ICJ and Its Lip Service to the Non-Priority Status of the
Equidistance Method of Delimitation, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 53, 53 (2015).
48
See Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24).
49 See Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
50 See Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in Caribbean
Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.) 2007 I.C.J. 659 (Oct. 8).
51 Id. ¶ 287.
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Another guiding principle which the ICJ and arbitral tribunals have used in
delimitation cases is equity. In the 1982 delimitation case between Libya and
Tunisia, the ICJ defined this principle:
Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of
justice. The Court whose task is by definition to administer
justice is bound to apply it. In the course of the history of
legal systems, the term "equity" has been used to define
various legal concepts. It was often contrasted with the rigid
rules of positive law, the severity of which had to be
mitigated in order to do justice. In general, this contrast has
no parallel in the development of international law; [sic] the
legal concept of equity is a general principle directly
applicable as law. Moreover, when applying positive
international law, a court may choose among several
possible interpretations of the law the one which appears, in
the light of the circumstances of the case, to be closest to the
requirements of justice.52
In this sense, equity requires that delimitation be just, implying that the
equidistance line cannot be the sole delimitation method. Alternatively, as the
ICJ put it in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case: “Equity does not
necessarily imply equality.”53 Another concept is proportionality, based on
the idea that the proportion of maritime zones should correspond to the length
of coast.54 This was invoked by Germany in the continental shelf delimitation
case of 1969.55 The ICJ did not accept this outright, but rather used it as a test
for equity:
A final factor to be taken account of is the element of a
reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation
effected according to equitable principles ought to bring
about between the extent of the continental shelf
appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths of their
respective coastlines, these being measured according to
their general direction in order to establish the necessary
balance between States with straight, and those with
markedly concave or convex coasts, or to reduce very
irregular coastlines to their truer proportions.56
52

Continental Shelf (Tunis v. Libya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18, ¶ 71 (Feb. 24).
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 91 (Feb. 20).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. ¶ 98.
53
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Importantly, the 1969 ruling stated that there is no reason why only one
method should be used: “[N]o objection need be felt to the idea of effecting a
delimitation of adjoining continental shelf areas by the concurrent use of
various methods.”57 In other words, the equidistance line is a helpful tool, but
there are several others that may be used when defining a boundary.
C. Boundaries & International Jurisdiction
Of the Arctic maritime boundaries, only one boundary is still in
dispute: that between the United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea.58 Four
boundaries have been delimited through agreements negotiated without thirdparty involvement. However, this status quo refers only to the boundaries
within the 200 nm EEZ.59 Beyond this area, disputes remain with several
Arctic states having overlapping claims and await recommendations by the
Committee on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). UNCLOS holds
that maritime boundaries should be formed by international agreement. 60
These agreements may be the result of negotiations or come into being
through the ruling of a court or an arbitration tribunal.61
A key difference between the dispute resolution methods above is
transparency. In closed negotiations between two parties, it is difficult to gain
insights into the arguments given and concessions allowed. We can only infer
the political pressures exerted on the disputing parties from what is made
public. In contrast, open court cases are associated with transparency and
allow the public to comprehend the range of influences determining how a
boundary is decided.
Arctic states that have joined UNCLOS have accepted different
dispute settlement procedures: Denmark and Norway have chosen the ICJ’s
resolution mechanism;62 Canada has chosen ITLOS and Annex VII

57

Id. ¶ 90.
Schofield & Østhagen, supra note 19, at 176.
59
See Andreas Østhagen & Clive Schofield, An ocean apart? Maritime boundary
agreements and disputes in the Arctic Ocean, THE POLAR J. (Sept. 2021),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2154896X.2021.1978234.
58

60

UNCLOS, supra note 29, arts. 74(1), 83(1).
UNCLOS refers boundary delimitation disputes to Part XV. This includes the provision
of compulsory dispute settlement measures. UNCLOS, art 286. Ratifying states can declare
in writing which method(s) they accept: a) the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea,
b) the ICJ, c) Annex VII arbitration, or d) Annex VIII arbitration, which deals with special
cases. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 287(1).
62 Settlement of Disputes Mechanism, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA, https://www.un.org/depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm (last
updated Aug. 30, 2019).
61
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arbitration;63 and Russia has chosen ITLOS for disputes related to the prompt
release of detained vessels and crews, Annex VIII special arbitration for
disputes relating to fisheries, marine scientific research and navigation, and
the protection and preservation of the marine environment (including
pollution from vessels and dumping), and Annex VII arbitration for all other
disputes. In general, when two parties to a dispute have different preferred
methods, the default method is Annex VII arbitration, unless the parties agree
otherwise.64 However, boundary disputes are among the categories of
disputes that can be excluded from compulsory dispute settlement, as are
disputes concerning military activity and disputes related to the UN Security
Council.65 Russia and Canada have excluded all of these from the UNCLOS
compulsory dispute resolution procedure according to Part XV. Norway and
Denmark have only excluded Annex VII arbitration for Article 298 disputes.66
Until now, the ICJ has not heard a case directly related to the Arctic,
but has issued many rulings on territorial and border disputes. The
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), established by
UNCLOS, has ruled on three disputes about the delimitation of maritime
boundaries.67 ITLOS has stated that customary law from rulings play a
significant role in deciding delimitation cases: “In a matter that has so
significantly evolved over the last [60] years, customary law also has a
particular role that, together with judicial and arbitral decisions, helps to shape
the considerations that apply to any process of delimitation.” 68 ITLOS refers
to rulings of ITLOS and the ICJ equally. ITLOS views the
equidistance/relevant circumstances method as the established delimitation
method: “The Tribunal notes that jurisprudence has developed in favour of
the equidistance/relevant circumstances method. This is the method adopted
by international courts and tribunals in the majority of the delimitation cases
that have come before them.”69
63

Id.
UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 287(5).
65 UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 298.
66 Settlement of Disputes Mechanism, supra note 62.
67
List of Cases, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA,
https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2021).
68 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case
No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 4, ¶ 184.
69 Id. ¶ 238. This is done in a three-stage process: “[A]t the first stage [the Tribunal] will
construct a provisional equidistance line, based on the geography of the Parties’ coasts and
mathematical calculations. Once the provisional equidistance line has been drawn, it will
proceed to the second stage of the process, which consists of determining whether there are
any relevant circumstances requiring adjustment of the provisional equidistance line; if so,
it will make an adjustment that produces an equitable result. At the third and final stage in
this process the Tribunal will check whether the line, as adjusted, results in any significant
disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio of the relevant
64

GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.

14

II.

[Vol. 50:1

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: DEGREES OF COMPLIANCE TO THE LAW OF THE
SEA
There are several shades of Russian compliance to the law of the sea
that may provide useful inferences for Arctic conflicts. We review the most
important ones.
A. Svalbard
Norway and Russia are in dispute about Norway’s sovereignty claims
over Svalbard. Svalbard was regarded as terra nullius – land that has “vacant
and belonging to no one else”70 – until the 1920 Svalbard Treaty established
that Norway would have the “full and absolute sovereignty” over the
Archipelago of Spitsbergen (as Svalbard used to be called).71 The treaty
included some limits to Norway’s power over Svalbard in the treaty, including
that all nationals of the contracting parties could become a resident of
Svalbard and fish, hunt,72 and carry out mining or other commercial
operations there.73 The treaty explains these limitations with the wish that the
territories would be “provided with an equitable regime, in order to assure
their development and peaceful utilization.”74
However, there are lasting disputes on issues related to the Svalbard
Treaty, as well as on the interpretation of the treaty itself. These disputes
maritime areas allocated to each Party.” Id. ¶ 240. For years, the Arctic and its issues have
been compared with the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the two conflicts are not similar.
Magnusson & Norchi, supra note 116, at 247. The two parties subject to the South China
Sea Arbitration were the Philippines and China. See South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v.
China), Case No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/.
The case dealt with historic rights, activities regarding marine resources and the nine-dashline, which China considers a demarcation line. Id. Due to the UNCLOS compulsory
dispute resolution mechanism, the Philippines was able to bring the case before court,
despite objections and non-participation by China. Id. at 3. The arbitration tribunal decided
that the dispute focused on islands that China attempted to use to claim an EEZ. Id. at 175.
Since China had made a declaration under UNCLOS Article 298 excluding boundary
disputes from binding dispute resolution, the tribunal could not set a boundary. Id. at 92.
However, the tribunal did consider itself to have jurisdiction to rule on the question of
whether the islands China claimed as basis for its EEZs could be considered islands
according to UNCLOS. Id. at 464. It found that they did not. Id.
70 THE NEW O XFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1161 (Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan eds.,
2008).
71 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen art. 1, Feb. 9, 1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 8
[Svalbard Treaty].
72 Svalbard Treaty, supra note 71, art. 2.
73 Svalbard Treaty, supra note 71, art. 3.
74 Svalbard Treaty, supra note 71.
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involve the rights to Svalbard’s rich resources, like fish and oil, and could
include rights to shipping, as Arctic ice melts.75 Today forty-four states are
party to the agreement, including all of the Arctic states. The dispute between
Russia and Norway involves questions about who is allowed to exploit and
benefit from the resources in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ): “The
Norwegian government argues that the equal rights of fishing and mining do
not apply beyond the territorial sea, whereas a number of other States parties
take the opposite view.”76 The 1920 Svalbard Treaty only covers territorial
waters (four nautical miles), considering the concept of EEZ extending 200
nautical miles had not been defined by international law at the time of the
treaty’s signing. Norway does not want to grant other states equal rights in the
EEZ, while Iceland, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom
argue the opposite.
A Russian news report from 2017 noted that the Russian government
sees the potential for military conflict with Norway because it assumes that
Norway wants “absolute national jurisdiction over the [Svalbard] archipelago
and the adjacent 200-mile water area.”77 Despite confrontations, an analysis
by the Arctic Institute suggests that the two countries have opted for
cooperation and interest alignment rather than escalation.78 One reason for this
may be that Russia potentially benefits more from the status quo than if
conflict actually erupted.79 Nevertheless, declining fish stocks could cause the
conflict to escalate.80
B. Bering Strait
In 1990, Russia’s first bilateral Arctic delimitation agreement was
concluded as a result of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United
States.81 The agreement delimits economic zones and the continental shelf in
the Bering Sea, including the Bering Strait, and took nine years to negotiate.82
75

Robin Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard, in 14
CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA 551, 554 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2010).
76
Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 75, at 551.
77 Alexandra Djordjevic et al., Геополитика в помощь снабжению – Военным морякам
хватает вызовов и не хватает обеспечения [Geopolitics to Help Supply: Military
Sailors Have Enough Challenges and Not Enough Security], 183 KOMMERS. 1 (Oct. 3,
2017) (Russ.), https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3428044.
78 Andreas Østhagen, How Norway and Russia Avoid Conflict over Svalbard, THE ARCTIC
INST. (June 19, 2018), https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/norway-russia-avoid-conflictsvalbard/.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81See Magnusson & Norchi, supra note 16, at 251.
82

See Magnusson & Norchi, supra note 16, at 251-52.
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It was not ratified by Russia due to concerns that the Soviet Union’s poor
negotiation gave too much territory to the United States. 83 In practice,
however, the agreed boundary has not been challenged by Russia. 84 In fact,
the region is a positive example of functional cooperation between Russia and
the United States, at least in terms of environmental protection. 85 One reason
for this may be that the current agreement influences the Northern Sea
Route.86 While some believe that the Russian Government is considering
renegotiation,87 others believe that more could be lost than gained as a
consequence of this strategy.88 Russia mentioned this agreement in its
submission to the CLCS and stated: “The United States ratified this
Agreement; the Russian Federation applies it provisionally from the date of
signature to present.”89
C. Barents Sea
In 2010, Russia signed a boundary agreement with Norway covering
the Barents Sea – the Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian
Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents
Sea and the Arctic Ocean – which ended a 40-year dispute.90 The dispute
involved Russia and Norway’s overlapping claims to an areas of about
175,000 km2, covering the border between Svalbard on the Norwegian side

83

See Magnusson & Norchi, supra note 116, at 252; Paul Goble, Moscow May Soon End
‘Provisional Enforcement’ of 1990 Bering Strait Accord with US, EURASIA DAILY
MONITOR (Jan. 30, 2020, 8:05 PM) https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-may-soonend-provisional-enforcement-of-1990-bering-strait-accord-with-us/.
84 See Magnusson & Norchi, supra note 116, at 252.
85 See Berkman et al., supra note 12, at 198.
86 Goble, supra note 83.
87 Id.
88 Oksana Borisova et al., Разрыв ущербного договора грозит новым конфликтом
между Россией [Breaking of the Flawed Treaty Threatens a New Conflict Between Russia
and the United States], ВЗГЛЯД ДЕЛОВАЯ ГАЗЕТА [LOOK BUS. GAZ.] (Jan. 28, 2020)
(Russ.), https://vz.ru/politics/2020/1/28/1020438.html.
89 GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA, PARTIAL REVISED SUBMISSION OF THE R USSIAN FEDERATION TO
THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN RESPECT OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
10
(2015),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01_rev15/2015_08_03_Exe
c_Summary_English.pdf.
90 See Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning
Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Nor.Russ.,
Sept.
15,
2010
[Barents
Sea
Treaty],
https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/
NOR-RUS2010.PDF.
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and Franz Josef Land on the Russian side.91 The disputed area was divided
roughly in half.92 A press release by the Center for Borders Research stated:
“Both governments have praised the agreement believing that it will facilitate
offshore licensing and pave the way for future hydrocarbon exploration while
also maintaining the cooperative fisheries arrangements that have developed
over several decades.”93 Russia’s willingness to compromise was induced by
to the potential goodwill that could benefit its continental shelf submission.94
This dispute was resolved through diplomacy.95
D. Caspian Sea
Russia has been involved in water disputes beyond the Arctic such as
the dispute in the oil–and–gas–rich Caspian Sea, which has been at least
formally resolved. Initially, in 1921 and 1940, two agreements between the
Soviet Union and Iran reduced some uncertainties in the sea, but they did not
address boundaries or resources.96 The dispute arose again when three new
states emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union – Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan – asserted claims to the water, its seabed, and
the resources therein.97 The five states had to come to an agreement on
whether to consider the Caspian Sea as a sea – and therefore UNCLOS as
applicable – or as a lake, which would have different implications about
possible state claims.98 A breakthrough came in 2018, when an agreement was
reached: the Caspian Sea would get a special status.99 The treaty still did not
allocate the entire seabed, and it remains unclear if a pipeline can be built, but
all five littoral states signed it.100
91

Arild Moe et al., Space and Timing: Why Was the Barents Sea Delimitation Dispute
Resolved in 2010?, 34:3 POLAR GEOGRAPHY 145, 145 (2011).
92 Id. at 146.
93 Norway and Russia Sign Historic Maritime Boundary Agreement, IBRU CTR. BORDERS
RSCH.
(Sep.
17,
2010),
https://web.archive.org/web/20171119025248/https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary
_news/?itemno=10741&rehref=%2Fibru%2Fnews%2F&resubj=Boundary+news+Headli
nes.
94 Moe et al., supra note 91, at 155.
95 The treaty contains dispute settlement provisions when hydrocarbon repositories extend
across the boundary line. Barents Sea Treaty, supra note 90, art. 5. Any such disputes shall
be resolved according to Annex II. Id. If negotiations do not resolve the issue after six
months, an ad hoc arbitral tribunal shall be instituted. Id. at Annex II art. 3.
96 I. William Zartman, Sources of Negotiating Power in the Caspian Sea, 19 PIN POINTS 1
(2002).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 2018, 58 I.L.M., 399,
https://doi.org/10.1017/ilm.2019.5.
100 Id.
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E. Ukraine vs. Russian Federation
In November 2018, three Ukrainian naval vessels were detained by
authorities of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea near the Kerch Strait.101
Ukraine stated that the ships were on their way from Odessa to Berdyansk,
one of the two Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov,102 while Russia claimed
that the vessels had illegally crossed its state border.103 Ukraine instituted
arbitral proceedings under Annex VII on March 31, 2019, and on April 16,
2019, submitted to ITLOS a “request for provisional measures, accordingly
instituted proceedings under Annex VII to the Convention.”104
Two weeks later, the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Germany
wrote to the Tribunal stating they would not participate in the hearing. 105 The
reason given therein was that both parties made reservations under Article 298
of UNCLOS, which exempted “disputes concerning military activities” from
compulsory measures set out in Part XV section 2.106 The note also stated that
the Russian Federation would nonetheless submit to the Court written
materials about its position on the case.107 These submissions were sent on
May 7, 2019, and public hearing commenced on May 10, 2019.108
Addressing the question of jurisdiction and the applicability of
Article 298 declarations, the tribunal concurred with the Ukrainian argument
that the case was not about military activity but about law enforcement
activities.109 The Tribunal also decided to proceed with the hearing despite
Russia not being present because under Article 28 of the statute, a case cannot
be halted by one party not appearing at a hearing and therefore failing to
defend itself, if the other party wishes the proceedings to continue.110 The
tribunal prescribed provisional measures:

101

Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order 2019/2
of
May
2,
2019,
¶
30,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/26/C26_Order_25.05.pdf.
102 Id. ¶ 31.
103 See id. ¶ 32.
104 Id. ¶ 35.
105 See id. ¶ 8.
106 UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 298.
107 See Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order
2019/2
of
May
2,
2019,
¶
12,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/26/C26_Order_25.05.pdf.
108 See id.
109 See id. ¶¶ 63-77.
110 See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 28, ITLOS,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/statute_en.pdf.
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Having examined the measures requested by Ukraine, the
Tribunal considers it appropriate under the circumstances of
the present case to prescribe provisional measures requiring
the Russian Federation to release the three Ukrainian naval
vessels and the 24 detained Ukrainian servicemen and to
allow them to return to Ukraine in order to preserve the rights
claimed by Ukraine.111
This was passed by nineteen votes to one, with the one dissenting
vote coming from the Russian judge, Roman Kolodkin.112 The Russian judge
argued along the same lines as the Russian Federation, that “the Arbitral
Tribunal prima facie lacks jurisdiction to consider the dispute because of the
‘military activities exception.’”113 Five of the nineteen judges also made
additional declarations or issued separate opinions.114
Both parties submitted compliance reports to the ITLOS Registry.
Ukraine wrote that Russia had not complied with any part of the order,
including the return and release of vessels and servicemen, and the
commitment to not further aggravate the dispute; specifically, Ukraine cited
the May 27 decision by a Moscow City Court to extend detention of five of
the servicemen by three months.115 The Russian Federation stated in its report
that it would release the vessels and servicemen, despite them being under
investigation for violating Russian legislation.116 The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation communicated the same to the Ukrainian
Embassy in Moscow, in a note verbale; however, it had asked Ukraine for
“written guarantees of participation of each of the 24 Ukrainian sailors” in the
Russian proceedings, and “written guarantees of the preservation of physical

111

Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order 2019/2
of
May
2,
2019,
¶
118,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/26/C26_Order_25.05.pdf.
112 See id. ¶ 124.
113 Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Dissenting
Opinion
of
Judge
Kolodkin
of
May
25,
2019,
¶
1,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/26/C26_Order_disop_RK.pdf.
114 See Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of
May
25,
2019,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/26/C26_Order_25.05.pdf.
115 See Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Report
of Ukraine of June 25, 2019, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/26/C26_-_UA_Report_on_Compliance.pdf.
116 See Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Report
of
Russian
Federation
of
June
25,
2019,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/26/C26_Report_Russian_Federatio
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evidence” of the naval vessels.117 On September 7, the sailors were released
as part of a prisoner swap, in which each country released 35 prisoners. 118
Moreover, in November 2019, according to media reports, Russia returned the
vessels with tugboats to Ukraine.119 In this dispute, Russia’s approach was to
reject the jurisdiction of an international court, bypassing the court’s
enforcement capacity, because of its relative military advantage in the
conflict.120
F. Netherlands vs. Russian Federation
ITLOS has only once ruled on an Arctic dispute. In September 2013,
the Arctic Sunrise, a vessel flying the flag of the Netherlands and chartered by
the environmental NGO Greenpeace, was used to stage a protest near the
Prirazlomnoye oil drilling platform that was located in the south-eastern
Barents Sea and part of Russia’s EEZ.121 Russian authorities seized the ship
and arrested thirty people on board, arguing that the actions of Greenpeace
constituted piracy under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.122
Netherlands instituted arbitration proceedings in accordance with UNCLOS
Annex VII, registered at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and called on
ITLOS for provisional measures to release the ship and persons. 123 ITLOS
granted the provisional measures, and the persons were to be released on a
bond for 3,600,000 euros.124 Russia, however, did not participate in the
proceedings as it did not accept the tribunal’s jurisdiction.125 Russia
underscored that they had excluded disputes about military and law
enforcement activities from the UNCLOS compulsory dispute resolution
mechanism, and that this was a case falling under that exception.126 ITLOS
117

Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26,
Supplementary
Report
of
Ukraine
of
June
26,
2019,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/26/C_-_26__UA_Supplementary_Report_on_Compliance_with_annex.pdf.
118 Marc Bennetts, Families Reunite in Russia-Ukraine Prisoner Exchange, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept. 7, 2019, 9:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/07/long-awaitedrussia-ukraine-prisoner-exchange-begins.
119 Russia Returns Navy Vessels Seized from Ukraine, D EUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://p.dw.com/p/3TBsi.
120 See Id.
121 Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Arctic Sunrise Incident: A Multifaceted Law of the Sea Case
with A Human Rights Dimension, 29 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 244 (2014).
122 Id. at 245.
123
Arctic Sunrise Case (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 22, Order of Nov. 22, 2013,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/published/C22_Order_
221113.pdf.
124 Id. ¶ 96.
125 Id. ¶ 42.
126 Id.
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dismissed this argument but without addressing it in detail.127 A separate joint
opinion by Judges Wolfrum and Kelly states “it is worth mentioning that the
activities undertaken by the Russian authorities prima facie are not to be
considered as ‘military activities’ as referred to in the declaration,” 128 and
expands on why the Russia declaration did not justify Russia’s nonappearance:
To the extent that the Russian Federation relied on this
declaration to justify its non-appearance, it is called for to
state that this declaration cannot justify the non-appearance.
Even if the declaration would exclude the jurisdiction of the
Annex VII arbitral tribunal, the decision on its jurisdiction
rests with that tribunal and not with the Russian Federation.
International courts and tribunals have a sole right to decide
on their jurisdiction.129
The arbitral tribunal established the issues of the case as whether Russian
authorities should have obtained the Netherlands’ consent before boarding
and investigating the ship, whether Russia violated UNCLOS by not
participating in the ITLOS proceedings, and the amount Russia should pay in
damages for the seized ship.130 In addition, the European Court of Human
Rights was called on by the crew and passengers of the Arctic Sunrise to rule
on their claims, namely that their arrest was “deprivation of liberty” in the
scope of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention, that they were falsely
accused of piracy, and that their right to peaceful protest had been violated. 131
The legal bases in consideration were UNCLOS, the Human Rights
Convention, and customary international law.132 Russia did not participate in
the proceedings, and it stated that it did not accept ITLOS jurisdiction.133
However, Russia released the crew and the others anyway, and after a further

127
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six months the ship was released.134 In Russia, this was justified not by the
ITLOS decision but based on a domestic decision by the Russian investigative
committee.135
III.

THE LOMONOSOV RIDGE DISPUTE

Stretching through the Arctic from Russia’s New Siberian Islands to
Ellesmere Island in the Canadian Arctic, the Lomonosov Ridge separates the
American and the Eurasian basins and spans about 1800 km.136 Russia,
Denmark and Canada have claimed the Lomonosov Ridge as a prolongation
of the margin of their continental shelf.137 The United States has stated its
view that the Lomonosov Ridge is a standalone feature, not belonging to the
continental shelf of any of the Arctic states.138 The category of seafloor high,
to which the Lomonosov Ridge belongs, is highly important for its legal
characterization.139 States intending to extend their continental shelf and show
that the Lomonosov Ridge forms part of their territory are usually obliged to
submit geological and geographical evidence to the UN Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which is made up of scientists.140
Submissions to CLCS must contain information on whether there are
unresolved disputes with other states about all or parts of their claims. Only
the executive summaries of the states’ submissions are public.
A. Russian submission
In 2001, Russia was the first state to provide its submission to the
CLCS and included their claims over the Lomonosov Ridge.141 The other
Arctic states and Japan notified the CLCS that there was not enough data to
evaluate the claim.142 In its submission, Russia labelled the Lomonosov Ridge
134

John Vidal, Arctic 30: Russia Releases Greenpeace Ship, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2014,
7:05 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/06/arctic-30-sunriserussia-to-release-greenpeace-ship.
135 Greenpeace: Russian Investigative Committee Closes Arctic Sunrise Case, INTERFAX
(Oct. 1, 2014, 12:14 PM) https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/40325/.
136 See Byers, supra note 29, at 43.
137 See id. at 46.
138 United States Mission to the United Nations, Communication with Regard to the
Submission Made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental
Shelf
(Oct.
30,
2015),
https://www.un.org/depts//los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01_rev15/2015_11_02_US
_NV_RUS_001_en.pdf.
139 See Byers, supra note 29, at 45.
140 UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 76.
141 GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA, supra note 89, at 5.
142Jon D. Carlson et al., Scramble for the Arctic, 33 SAIS REV. INT’L AFF. 21, 29 (2013).
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as a submarine elevation.143 The Commission advised Russia that the ridge
could not be considered as such and “recommend[ed] that according to the
materials provided in the submission the Lomonosov Ridge cannot be
considered a submarine elevation under the Convention.”144 The significance
of this is that submarine elevations can extend the area over which a state has
sovereign control beyond the 350 nm limit applied to submarine ridges:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on
submarine ridges, the outer limit of the continental shelf
shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This
paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are
natural components of the continental margin, such as its
plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs.145
In a 2015 submission, Russia provided extensive details on the nature of the
Lomonosov Ridge, with the executive summary recounting how the Arctic
Basin was formed many million years (Ma) ago and concluding that the
Lomonosov Ridge is in fact a submarine elevation.146 The Russian submission
explains that the Commission’s conclusion was based on insufficient data and
that new seismic sounding and other data collection since then have proven
their earlier claim.147 Furthermore, the Russian submission mentions that
consultations with each of the competing states (Canada and Denmark) have
taken place and statements would be provided to the CLCS to ensure that the
evaluation goes ahead.148 Moreover, Russia has underscored the following
unresolved disputes of maritime delimitations in the Arctic Ocean: 1) between
Russia and Denmark in areas of the Lomonosov Ridge, 2) between Russia and
Canada on the Mendeleev Rise.149
B. Danish submission
Denmark submitted its Arctic claim on behalf of Greenland in 2014,
ten years after Denmark ratified UNCLOS. 150 The coast of Greenland is the
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closest to the North Pole of any of the Arctic states, being about 2,000
kilometers away.151 In its submission, Denmark claims the Lomonosov Ridge
as part of Greenland: “The Lomonosov Ridge is both morphologically and
geologically an integral part of the Northern Continental Margin of
Greenland.”152 Based on the executive summary of their submission, it
appears that their claim relies on a comparison of rock samples and geologic
historical evidence.153 To comply with the rules of procedure regarding claims
of disputed maritime areas, the submission contains the disclaimer that
negotiations are in place with the four other Arctic states who may have
overlapping claims and that any decision by the CLCS will not prejudice any
negotiations on delimitation.154 Regarding Norway, the Danish submission
mentions that there is an agreement in place for the area between Greenland
and Svalbard.155
C. Canadian submission
Canada submitted their claim to the CLCS on May 23, 2019.156 They
acquired bathymetric, gravimetric, and seismic reflection data using ice
breakers and camps, as well as 800 kg of rock samples from six sites. 157 It
claims part of the Lomonosov Ridge and points that exceed the 350 nm
limit.158 After Canada made its submission, the CLCS received comments on
it from the Governments of Russia, Denmark, and the U.S. 159 Since they
COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2014),
https://www.un.org/depts//los/clcs_new/submissions_files/dnk76_14/dnk2014_es.pdf.
151 Id. at 12.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 18
155 Id. at 17.
156 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, PARTIAL SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF
THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF BY CANADA: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 (2019),
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/CDA_ARC_ES
_EN_secured.pdf.
157 Id. at 6.
158 Id. at 8-9.
159 United States Mission to the United Nations, Communications Received with Regard
to the Partial Submission Made by Canada to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental
Shelf
(Aug.
28,
2019)
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/2019_08_28_U
SA_NV_UN_001.pdf (“[T]he Government of the United States confirms that it does not
object to Canada’s request”); Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations,
Communications Received with Regard to the Partial Submission Made by Canada to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Aug. 29, 2019),
un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/2019_08_29_DNK_NV_UN
_002.pdf (“[I]t does not object to the consideration of the partial submission of Canada by
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discussed the matter with the Government of Canada beforehand, all of them
noted the overlap of Canada’s claim with their own and confirmed that they
had no objections to the Commission making a recommendation based on it,
as long as this would not prejudice their own claims or any further border
negotiation between themselves and Canada.160 In contrast to the other two
submissions, Canada states explicitly that their continental shelf limits “will
depend on delimitation with the Kingdom of Denmark, the Russian Federation
and the United States of America.”161
D. United States comments
The United States has not ratified UNCLOS and therefore has not
made a submission. However, it has sent note verbales after every submission
dealing with the Arctic Ocean since Russia’s first submission in 2001. That
first note verbale included their general arguments, including on the
Lomonosov Ridge; noting “[t]he [Lomonosov] ridge is a freestanding feature
in the deep, oceanic part of the Arctic Ocean Basin, and not a natural
component of the continental margin of either Russia or any other State.” 162
Following Russia’s submission of 2015, the US observations include points
the Commission”); Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations,
Communications Received with Regard to the Partial Submission Made by Canada to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/2019_12_03_R
US_NV_UN_001_en.pdf (“[T]he Russian Federation does not object to the Commission’s
consideration of the submission made by Canada”).
160 United States Mission to the United Nations, Communications Received with Regard
to the Partial Submission Made by Canada to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental
Shelf
(Aug.
28,
2019)
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/2019_08_28_U
SA_NV_UN_001.pdf (“[T]he Government of the United States confirms that it does not
object to Canada’s request”); Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations,
Communications Received with Regard to the Partial Submission Made by Canada to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Aug. 29, 2019),
un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/2019_08_29_DNK_NV_UN
_002.pdf (“[I]t does not object to the consideration of the partial submission of Canada by
the Commission”); Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations,
Communications Received with Regard to the Partial Submission Made by Canada to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/2019_12_03_R
US_NV_UN_001_en.pdf (“[T]he Russian Federation does not object to the Commission’s
consideration of the submission made by Canada”).
161 Id. at 9.
162 United States, Notification Regarding the Submission Made by the Russian Federation
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 3 (Mar. 18, 2002),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__
USAtext.pdf.
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about the Bering Strait agreement, they state that both parties, Russia and the
United States, have abided by the 1990 treaty.163 With this, they implicitly
make the statement that the maritime boundary once agreed on, but not ratified
by Russia, should be considered customary law.164
IV.

THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE DISPUTE

The dispute over the status of the Northern Sea Route (“NSR”) is
mainly a conflict between Russia and the United States dating back to the
1960s.165 Russia claims jurisdiction over the route due to parts of the route go
through its internal waters and that it has jurisdiction over the route. 166
Accordingly, Russia has enacted national laws, which require vessels to apply
for access to the route thirty days prior to passage and to employ Russian
icebreakers and mandatory pilotage, as well as to cover the costs for these
services.167 This policy has been seen by the United States as infringement on
international law, particularly on the right of freedom of navigation and more
specifically on the right of transit passage through international straits. 168 A
2012 federal amendment law classified the Northern Sea Route as a
“historically developed national transport communication of the Russian
Federation” going through all the different maritime zones: “The area of the
Northern Sea Route means a water area adjoining the northern coast of the
Russian Federation, including internal sea waters, territorial sea, contiguous
zone and exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation.”169 This law,
titled On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation
163

United States, Communication with Regard to the Submission Made by the Russian
Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Oct. 30, 2015),
https://www.un.org/depts//los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01_rev15/2015_11_02_US
_NV_RUS_001_en.pdf.
164 Once the Commission has issued its recommendations on the outer limits of the
continental shelves of the applicants, the five Arctic states can delimit the shelf according
to Article 83 UNCLOS. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 83.
165 Christopher C. Joyner, The Legal Regime for the Arctic Ocean, 18 FLA. ST. U. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 230, 230-31 (2006).
166 Id. at 230.
167 See generally Viatcheslav Gavrilov, Russian Legislation on the Northern Sea Route
Navigation: Scope and Trends, 10 THE POLAR J. 273, 277 (2020).
168 Joyner, supra note 165, at 230-31; UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 38.
169 Federal’nyĭ zakon ot 28 iiulia 2012 goda N. 132-FZ o vnesenii izmeneniĭ v otdel’nye
zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii v chasti gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniia
torgovogo moreplavaniia v akvatorii Severnogo morskogo puti [Federal Law of 28 July
2012 No. 132-FZ of the Russian Federation on Amendments to Specific Legislative Acts
of the Russian Federation Related to Governmental Regulation of Merchant Shipping in
the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA
ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2012,
art. 5.1 and art. 14.
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Concerning State Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Water Area of the
Northern Sea Route, established the current Northern Sea Route regime.170
The Russian Federation updated relevant provisions of the 1999 Merchant
Shipping Code and the 1998 Federal Law No. 155-FZ On the Internal Sea
Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.171 On the basis of this, the
Northern Sea Route Administration (NSRA) adopted new rules in 2013,
making the process more clear-cut and convenient for foreign ships.172
According to the 1990 rules, which they replaced, the authority had four
months to reply to a request of thoroughfare, which had to be transmitted by
telegraph.173 Now, the NSRA has 25 days to respond and the request can be
made via the internet.174
Russia has provided legal justifications for the NSR regime. On the
one hand, the route goes through internal waters based on historic title and, in
1985, the USSR drew straight baselines along its Arctic coast, in some places
connecting islands with its mainland, thereby officially claiming the waters
between the landmasses as internal waters.175 On the other hand, Russia has
justified its legislation with recourse to UNCLOS Article 234 on “ice-covered
areas,” arguing that its NSR regime is necessary, inter alia, to protect the
environment.176

170

Viatcheslav Gavrilov, Russian Legislation on the Northern Sea Route Navigation:
Scope and Trends, 10 THE POLAR J. 273, 277 (2020).
171 Federal’nyĭ zakon ot 28 iiulia 2012 goda N. 132-FZ o vnesenii izmeneniĭ v otdel’nye
zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii v chasti gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniia
torgovogo moreplavaniia v akvatorii Severnogo morskogo puti [Federal Law of 28 July
2012 No. 132-FZ of the Russian Federation on Amendments to Specific Legislative Acts
of the Russian Federation Related to Governmental Regulation of Merchant Shipping in
the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA
ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2012,
art. 5.1 and art. 14.
172 Id.
173 Viatcheslav Gavrilov, Russian Legislation on the Northern Sea Route Navigation:
Scope and Trends, 10 THE POLAR J. 273, 277 (2020).
174 Id.
175 Scovazzi, supra note 38, at 175.
176 UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 234 (“Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce
non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of
marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive
economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice
covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due
regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based
on the best available scientific evidence.”); Scovazzi, supra note 38, at 175-177.
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The freedom of the seas in the Arctic lies at the core of US national
security policy.177 The United States maintains that the Vilkitsky, Shokalsky,
Sannikov, and Laptev Straits, which Russia claims as internal waters, are
straits used for international navigation, and therefore are open for free transit
passage by international vessels.178 This leads to Russia’s NSR regime is
being seen as a violation of this right.179 In 1965, a US Coast Guard icebreaker
was ordered to sail through the Northern Sea Route, though it was aborted
midway (probably due to Soviet diplomatic pressure) and, in 1967, the US
attempted to traverse the Vilkitsky Straits with two vessels as a challenge to
the USSR’s claims, which was also abandoned when the Soviet Union denied
the ships passage.180
The United States’ point of view has been expressed in statements by
government departments and officials.181 In contrast to the Lomonosov Ridge
disputes, there is no formal obstacle within UNCLOS that prevents the referral
of this dispute to the compulsory dispute resolution mechanism – UNCLOS
does not contain an exception for considering straight baselines or the
question of the status of straits.182 However, the US has signed the Agreement
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
DEFENSE,
ARCTIC
STRATEGY
(2019),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTICSTRATEGY.PDF. (“The Department will preserve the global mobility of US military and
civilian vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic, including through the exercise of the
Freedom of Navigation program to challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by other
Arctic States when necessary.”) The document specifically mentions “the freedom of
navigation [...] through strategic straits.” Id. PAUL ARTHUR BERKMAN ET AL., BASELINE OF
RUSSIAN ARCTIC LAWS 428 (2019).
178 Paul Gudev, The Northern Sea Route: А National or an International Transportation
Corridor?,
RUSS.
INT’L
AFFS
COUNCIL
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-northern-sea-route-anational-or-an-international-transportation-corridor/.
179 PAUL ARTHUR BERKMAN ET AL., BASELINE OF RUSSIAN ARCTIC LAWS 428 (2019).
180 S.M. OLENICOFF, TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE ARCTIC: THE SOVIET POSITION 13 (1972).
181 The State Department sent a note verbale to Russia on May 29, 2015. Diplomatic Note
to Russia, 29 May, 2015 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 526,
526 (Objecting to “the requirements to obtain Russia’s permission to enter and transit the
exclusive economic zone and territorial sea; persistent characterization of international
straits that form part of the NSR as internal waters; and the lack of any express exemption
for sovereign immune vessels”). It also disputes that there is such a concept as a historically
established national transport communication route in international law and disputes that
parts of the NSR are even ice-covered areas according to Art. 234, meaning covered in ice
most of the year. Id. at 526-27. In the opinion of the United States, the provision to use
Russian icebreakers violates the non-discrimination term in UNCLOS Art. 234. Id. at 527.
182 See Id. In Excessive Maritime Claims, Roach has described two commonly accepted
geographic conditions for the application of straight baselines: 1) localities where the
coastline is deeply indented and cut into or 2) where there is a fringe of islands along the
coast in its immediate vicinity. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE
MARITIME CLAIMS 7 (3d ed. 2012).
177
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to UNCLOS (which, in 1994, amended the treaty), but has not ratified it. Thus,
if the dispute between Russia and the US came to court, it would either be
tried based on customary international law or on the 1958 Law of the Sea
Conventions, which the US ratified in 1961.183 The situation is similar in the
maritime boundary dispute between Bahrain and Qatar, where the ICJ found:
“Neither Bahrain nor Qatar is party to the Geneva Conventions on the Law of
the Sea of 29 April 1958; Bahrain has ratified the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 but Qatar is only a signatory to
it. Customary international law, therefore, is the applicable law.”184
The law on straight baselines lacks precision. Russia has applied
straight baselines along its shore, while the US is part of a minority of coastal
states which have not claimed straight baselines.185 The concept of straight
baselines dates back to the Fisheries Case, in which the ICJ allowed Norway
to apply them.186 Straight baselines were then incorporated into the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.187 Now UNCLOS
Article 7 provides for the application of straight baselines “[i]n localities
where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.”188 It is unclear whether a
court would see Russia’s application of straight baselines as justified. Despite
the widespread practice among states to draw straight baselines, there are only
a handful of rulings by international courts and tribunals in which they have
decided on the application of straight baselines. The ICJ addressed this topic
twice, in the cases United Kingdom v. Norway in 1951 (Fisheries Case) and
Qatar v. Bahrain in 2001, as did the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
2016 South China Sea Arbitration.189 Of the three ITLOS cases dealing with
maritime boundaries, none mentions straight baselines.190
183

See 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS HISTORIC
ARCHIVES, https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2021).
184 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J.
40, ¶ 167 (Mar. 16).
185 Donat Pharand, State practice on the use of state baselines, in CANADA 'S ARCTIC
WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 147-158 (1988).
186 Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
187 United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29,
1958 , 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
188 UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 7.
189 Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 40, ¶ 167 (Mar. 16); South
China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case Repository No. 2013-19, Award of July
12, 2016, ¶ ¶ 258-59 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/.
190 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case
No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 4, ¶ 229; Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept.
23, 2017, ITLOS Rep. 4; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Indian Ocean
(Mauritius v. Maldives), Case No. 28, https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-
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In the Fisheries Case, the ICJ considered the straight baseline system
Norway had applied to its northern coast in 1935.191 This included straight
baselines around a “skjærgaard,” an archipelago of skerries and islets on the
coast, which the Court found permissible; “[i]f the belt of territorial waters
must follow the outer line of the ‘skjærgaard’, and if the method of straight
baselines must be admitted in certain cases, there is no valid reason to draw
them only across bays, as in Eastern Finnmark, and not also to draw them
between islands, islets and rocks, across the sea areas separating them, even
when such areas do not fall within the conception of a bay.”192 The court took
into account factors “beyond purely geographical factors: that of certain
economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which
are clearly evidenced by a long usage.”193 This led to the practice of states
drawing straight baselines connecting islands to the mainland. 194 In its ruling,
the ICJ required that straight baselines must be applied in the “general
direction of the coast.”195 Overall, this contradicts the Russian position, but
ICJ’s ruling lacks precision, as noted by the Committee on Baselines under
the International Law of the Sea and by academics alike.196
Furthermore, in the South China Sea arbitration, ITLOS discussed
the application of straight baselines as archipelagic baselines on the Spratly
Islands by China.197 The tribunal found that these were not applicable since
UNCLOS Article 7 does not apply to an offshore archipelago, with the
exception of archipelagic states.198 However, the discussion of the matter does
cases/dispute-concerning-delimitation-of-the-maritime-boundary-between-mauritius-andmaldives-in-the-indian-ocean-mauritius/maldives/.
191 Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
192 Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 3, 18 (Dec. 18).
193 Id. at 21.
194 Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, State Practices of Straight Baselines Institute Excessive
Maritime Claims, 42 S. ILL. U. L. J., 421, 422 (2019); See also, Coalter G. Lathrop,
Baselines, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 69, 86 (Donald R. Rothwell,
Alex G. Oude Elferink, Tim Stephens & Karen N. Scott eds., 2015).
195 Id. at 30. See also UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 7 (3) (“The drawing of straight baselines
must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the
sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be
subject to the regime of internal waters.”).
196 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, BASELINES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA: FINAL REPORT ¶ 106 (2018); Gayl S. Westerman, Straight Baselines in International
Law: A Call for Reconsideration, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 260, 276 (1988).
197 South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case Repository No. 2013-19,
Award of July 12, 2016, ¶ ¶ 258-59 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/.
198 The South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Decision of July
12, 2016, Permanent Court of Arbitration, https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/ (“Although the
Convention does not expressly preclude the use of straight baselines in other
circumstances, the Tribunal considers that the grant of permission in Article 7 concerning
straight baselines generally, together with the conditional permission in Articles 46 and 47
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not apply to the Northern Sea Route since no archipelagic baselines were
applied along the route. The Article would have applied to the offshore
archipelago of Franz Josef Land; however, Russia did not apply straight
baselines around that territory.199 A similar case to the Northern Sea Route
dispute is the case Bahrain v. Qatar, where the ICJ rejected the straight
baselines claimed by Bahrain.200 The case dealt with straight baselines applied
from main islands to (other) islands with the consequence that the waters in
between become internal waters. Bahrain stated that the Hawar Islands, which
lay closer to Qatar than to the other Bahrain islands, should be connected to
Bahrain because Bahrain was an archipelagic state.201 The ICJ ruled, inter alia,
that Bahrain was not an archipelagic state and therefore the Hawar Islands
could not be connected by straight baselines.202 The ICJ also noted that the
Hawar Islands could not be qualified as a fringe of islands.203
As the ICJ has remained largely negative about the applicable scope
of straight baselines, the US may have an advantage in the international
adjudication of the Northern Sea Route dispute. Since several states argue that
the application of straight baselines is excessive and that this practice by states
is not within the frame of the law,204 the United States fortifies its position by
arguing that the Russian position violates the right to transit passage. The
United States bases this claim on the concept of international straits, 205 as
classified in the Corfu Channel Case.206 Russia disputes that the NSR includes
such straits and proposes that its application of straight baselines classifies the
straits in question – the Vilkitsky, Shokalsky, Sannikov, and Laptev straits –
as internal waters, therefore placing the straits under its jurisdiction. 207

for certain States to draw archipelagic baselines, excludes the possibility of employing
straight baselines in other circumstances, in particular with respect to offshore archipelagos
not meeting the criteria for archipelagic baselines.”); UNCLOS, supra note 29, arts. 46,
47; Id.
199 Russia: Straight Baseline Claim, U.S. NAVY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS,
https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/RussiaChart.pdf (last visited
Dec. 14, 2021).
200
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J.
40, ¶ 167 (Mar. 16).
201

Id.
Id. ¶ 214.
203 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 196, ¶ 105.
204 See, e.g., Qureshi, supra note 36.
205
MICHAEL BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC 129 (2013).
206 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Dec. 15).
207 Paul Gudev, The Northern Sea Route: А National or an International Transportation
Corridor?,
RUSS.
INT’L
AFFS
COUNCIL
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-northern-sea-route-anational-or-an-international-transportation-corridor/.
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LEGAL-POLITICAL EQUILIBRIA

The two Arctic conflicts outlined in this paper indicate the rise of
different legal-political equilibria in maritime disputes that involve the
distribution of natural resources and the delimitation of boundaries. We
propose that Russia’s competitive claims – against Denmark and Canada in
the first dispute and against the United States in the second dispute – have
facilitated the emergence of three possible solutions: intergovernmental
regulation, voluntary mediation, and international adjudication. While
international adjudication refers to the resolution of interstate disputes before
the ICJ or an arbitration venue, intergovernmental regulation presumes the
primacy of diplomacy over adjudication as the basis for the long-term
resolution of territorial disputes. This legal-political equilibrium suggests that
foreign policy interests are more persistent than treaty or customary
international law and therefore offer the basis for a more sustainable solution
from which the parties involved have fewer incentives to deviate compared to
a judicial decision or an arbitral award. On the other hand, voluntary
mediation recognizes the inability of the parties involved to evade
international institutions and their incentive to opt for a set of self-enforcing
rules provided through an interstate treaty. The advantage of international
adjudication and voluntary mediation over intergovernmental regulation is the
higher degree of formality and enforceability, as there are also third parties
involved in the dispute, directly or indirectly. While intergovernmental
regulation prioritizes long-run adherence, international adjudication and
voluntary mediation prioritize formality and enforceability.
Of the Arctic countries, only Norway has received recommendations
on an extended continental shelf in the Arctic. Norway made two submissions:
the first in 2006 and the second in 2009, and received recommendations in
2009 and 2019, respectively.208 The CLCS adjusted the 2006 submission,
which Norway accepted.209 The 2009 submission, with adjustments about

208

Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines:
Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the Kingdom of Norway, COMMISSION ON
THE
LIMITS
OF
THE
CONTINENTAL
SHELF
(CLCS),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm
(last
updated Aug. 20, 2009); Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the Kingdom of
Norway, COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (CLCS),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor_30_2009.htm
(last updated Aug. 20, 2019).
See Thomas Nilsen, Limits of Norway’s Arctic Seabed Agreed, BARENTS OBSERVER
(Apr.
16,
2009),
https://web.archive.org/web/20141215154636/https:/barentsobserver.com/en/node/19278.
209
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claims around the island of Bouvetøya, was agreed on by the CLCS. 210
Norway never claimed the Lomonosov Ridge, and the submission did not
include an area that was overlapping with Russian claims.
A. The Lomonosov Ridge: International Adjudication vs. Voluntary
Mediation
As pointed out above, UNCLOS contains an exception to its
compulsory dispute settlement regime for maritime boundary disputes (Art.
298).211 This makes it possible for the twenty percent of states who have opted
for this exception to avoid binding third-party dispute settlement; Russia and
Canada are among those states.212 Furthermore, Denmark and Norway do not
accept Annex VII arbitration for this category of disputes. 213 This creates
significant obstacles toward an international adjudication of the Lomonosov
Ridge dispute. Nevertheless, states could change their course on their
declaration, which has happened before.214 In addition, Denmark has accepted
judicial jurisdiction and could refer the dispute to a court, which could, in turn,
find that it has jurisdiction despite the declaration of one of the parties under
Article 298.215 It may also rule on related issues, either geological or
geographical. Last but not least, the option of non-binding dispute resolution
210

See N.F. Coelho, CLCS: Bouvetøya Outer Continental Shelf Limits Clarified, DE
MARIBUS (May 13, 2019, 10:29 AM) https://demaribus.net/2019/05/13/clcs-bouvetoyaouter-continental-shelf-limits-clarified/.
211 See UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 298.
212 Robin Churchill, ‘Compulsory’ Dispute Settlement Under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea – How Has It Operated? Pt. 1, PLURICOURTS BLOG (June
9, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/blog/guests/2016-06-09churchill-unclos-pt-1.html.
213 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
214 For example, Argentina withdrew its declaration made under Article 298 to bring a case
against Ghana. Churchill, supra note 212.
215 In the 2012 Bangladesh vs. Myanmar (Bay of Bengal) Case, ITLOS discussed whether
it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute before the CLCS made a recommendation to
either of the two parties on their submissions. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in
the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS
Rep. 4, ¶¶ 3-4. The ruling declared that there is a difference between the competences of
the CLCS and the ITLOS Special Chamber, which comes down to the difference between
delineation of the continental shelf and delimitation of maritime boundaries, id. ¶ 376, and
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is also possible. Denmark and Canada share one boundary, which is already
agreed upon, and Russia has one agreed boundary with the US and one with
Norway.216 However, it is possible that if the Lomonosov Ridge dispute
comes before ITLOS and a party disagrees about the location of the boundary
– as was the situation between Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire – ITLOS would
initiate the delimiting procedure and draw a new boundary.217
The Timor-Leste v. Australia compulsory conciliation may constitute
a model for the resolution of the first Arctic conflict between Russia and both
Canada and Denmark.218 UNCLOS provides for the possibility that states can
unilaterally refer a maritime boundary dispute to settlement: Articles
297(2)(b), 297(3)(b) and 298(1)(a)(i) provide for compulsory conciliation
according to Annex V section 2.219 The Timor Leste dispute was related to a
maritime boundary and the exploitation of the Greater Sunrise oil field. The
Australian Government wanted the dispute to be dealt with by negotiation and
rejected proceedings before the ICJ.220 The reason for this may have been that
216
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Australia wanted a certain type of delimitation mechanism, the natural
prolongation method, which is not the one favored by international courts and
tribunals.221 On April 11, 2016, Timor Leste triggered the compulsory
conciliation.222
When the Conciliation Commission found that there was no bar to its
jurisdiction, Australia complied with the conciliation proceedings, as
evidenced by its appointing two conciliators. This first application of the
UNCLOS conciliation mechanism was successful and led to the parties
signing a treaty in 2018. The reasons for the positive outcome of this
mechanism include the low-risk nature of the conciliation mechanism,
because it is non-binding, as well as the ability of the Conciliation
Commission to put aside legal issues, such as established case law on
boundary delimitation, and take into account other factors including economic
concerns.223 This is an example of why voluntary mediation may be a more
likely and sustainable equilibrium than international adjudication in the
Lomonosov Ridge dispute.
If the CLCS recommends that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension
of the continental shelf of each of the claiming states, delimitation could be
referred to a court or tribunal. This could lead to Russia using its largest coast
in the Arctic to claim an adjustment of the allocated maritime area. If,
however, the CLCS recommends that the Russian continental shelf does not
extend to the Lomonosov Ridge, Russia cannot refer its claim to a tribunal,
since the latter can only decide upon a valid continental shelf. This is why
voluntary mediation in the form of conciliation can be a useful dispute
resolution mechanism. As shown in the Timor Leste vs. Australia case, the use
of this mechanism allowed the parties to sidestep legal issues and positions
and focus on finding common ground. This seems to be particularly relevant
for a dispute with three parties.
If the equidistance line is used, Denmark would have the strongest
arguments regarding the territorial status of the North Pole.224 It is unlikely
that Russia would accept a ruling which grants ownership of the North Pole
to one of the other two states.225 Canada and Denmark have already shown
their cooperation on the issue when scientists of both countries undertook a
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joint research trip to survey the sedimentary and crust layers of the
Lomonosov Ridge.226 This may involve a settlement of the dispute between
the two states related to Hans Island.227
Conciliation can be defined as “structured involvement of outsiders
in the settlement of international disputes”228 as it “combines the elements of
both inquiry and mediation.”229 The method can be regarded as “a kind of
institutionalised negotiation.”230 Conciliation commissions can investigate the
facts of the dispute, evaluate them, and make suggestions for the terms of
dispute resolution.231 Many conciliation cases deal in some part with legal
claims, but reports of conciliation commissions remain proposals, rather than
binding decisions.232 Often, failed negotiations are a prerequisite for
conciliation, and, sometimes, conciliation is a prerequisite for dispute
settlement by legal means.233 What is key for the Lomonosov Ridge dispute
is the invocation of the voluntary conciliation procedure.234 While there is
precedent for compulsory, non-binding conciliation, the strong
intergovernmental nature of this trilateral conflict makes voluntary
conciliation much more likely. This would resolve the dispute efficiently
because the conciliation commission would not have to stick to established
delimitation methods and, instead, would have the freedom to find a solution
acceptable to all three countries. A third (or in this case, fourth) party, such as
the European Union or the United States, could facilitate negotiation between
the three parties.
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B. The Northern Sea Route: Voluntary Mediation vs. Intergovernmental
Regulation
The Northern Sea Route dispute has two parties: the United States
and Russia.235 International adjudication of this conflict is not an option since
the United States has not ratified UNCLOS and does not have a history of
inviting third-party involvement in dispute resolution. Russia has brought one
case before an international court or tribunal: the Volga Case, which
concerned the prompt release of a Russian vessel accused of illegal fishing.236
However, even if the dispute settlement is a political process, international
law is likely to inform the outcome.
The main tradeoff here is between intergovernmental regulation and
voluntary mediation. While Russia recognizes the NSR as internal waters
based on its coastal jurisdiction, the United States claims the NSR as
international waters. Canada is likely to stay neutral given its security
alignment with the United States and its approximation to the Russian position
regarding the Northwest Passage. The actual frequency of international
navigation of the Northern Sea Route cannot form the basis of Russia’s
declaration as Russian internal waters. At the same time, Russia has an
economic interest in keeping the route open to cargo ships.237 Nevertheless,
the extreme difference between the respective stances of Russia and the
United States makes voluntary conciliation unlikely. Even if voluntary
conciliation granted the status of international waters to the NSR while
recognizing exclusive monitoring rights to Russia, it remains unlikely that
Russia would abide by this legal-political equilibrium, as it would have
incentives to deviate and reject de facto the enforcement of this outcome.
Intergovernmental regulation would entail an international treaty,
and this relies on customary international law and international judicial
precedent on the definition and delimitation of international waters. Some
international agreements contain dispute resolution provisions, while others
do not.238 UNCLOS provides for extensive dispute settlement mechanisms.
The agreement offers states a choice between different methods and provides
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special methods for certain issues, such as the Seabed Chamber to deal with
seabed disputes.239 The different settlement methods correspond to the
intensity of the disputes. Some methods are more popular with states than
others, depending on the dispute and the relationship between the parties. 240
One factor that has an impact on the effectiveness of the settlement of
maritime boundary disputes is the timing of the settlement.241 Østhagen argues
that the 2010 Russia-Norway Treaty regarding the Barents Sea would not have
been negotiated a decade later, when relations between the parties had
deteriorated due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
The difference between voluntary mediation and intergovernmental
regulation lies in the latter’s inclusion of the overall political-economic
environment into the proposed solution. Nevertheless, for this legal-political
equilibrium to arise, a further institutionalization of the Arctic political
economy is required. As early as in 1996, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and the
five Arctic states were able to create the Arctic Council, a soft-law institution
that would work to guarantee cooperation among these states.242 The Arctic
Council (“AC”) is organized in working groups on issues such as Arctic
contaminants and emergency response.243 The structure brings transparency
to the issues it covers, but its decision-making powers are limited, requiring a
consensus of all eight Arctic states. The Arctic Council also includes
representatives of the indigenous people of the Arctic and 38 observers, which
includes 13 non-Arctic states from Europe and Asia, various international
organizations, and NGOs.244
The Arctic Council offers a forum where negotiations for an
international treaty between the United States and Russia could take place. An
increasing number of non-regional states are applying for observer status,
which may undermine the cooperative dimension for Arctic states.245 Another
crucial issue for the AC regards security and military issues. 246 Ahead of its
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chairmanship of the AC, Russia has called for the inclusion of security
issues.247
An international treaty on the NSR must address compulsory
pilotage. Compulsory pilotage has been seen as a useful concept for a long
time, but it has not been incorporated into any treaty or international
regulation.248 Denmark implements this concept in Greenland, while Australia
introduced it in the Torres Strait in 2006 (though this was opposed by the
United States and Singapore).249 Compulsory pilotage for reasons of
environmental protection or protection against piracy has become
prevalent.250 Wolfrum criticized the involvement of these organizations since
they effectively become lawmakers, but he acknowledged that coastal states
understand the necessity of more tailored schemes:
The reasons for such supplementary measures are
dissatisfaction with the results achieved multilaterally and
the desire for unilaterally tailored solutions. For vessels, this
mixture of restrictions which seem to lack coherence is
difficult to cope with. At present, the limitations faced may
still be tolerable but if this trend prevails – and there are clear
indications that it will – a reassessment may be called for.251
V. CONCLUSION
In the search for the most effective dispute settlement method, the
tradeoffs between international adjudication, voluntary mediation, and
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intergovernmental regulation reveal both the intensity of legal and political
constraints as well as the feasibility of the proposed legal-political equilibria.
In the 1990s, scholars began discussing the proliferation of adjudication in
light of the establishment of several permanent international courts and
tribunals during the previous decade.252 Several scholars criticized this trend
due to its possible fragmentation of international law.253
Deteriorating U.S.-Russian relations and the contested definition of
international waters, which can be remedied for the Russian side with
compulsory pilotage or other exclusive monitoring rights, facilitate the rise of
intergovernmental regulation as the legal-political equilibrium for the
Northern Sea Route conflict. In contrast, the Lomonosov Ridge conflict
involves Canada and Denmark, which do not have open military and
diplomatic competition with Russia on a global scale. Thus, voluntary
mediation in the form of voluntary conciliation may be the legal-political
equilibrium with the highest probability of sustainability for this dispute.
Finally, the institutionalization of the Arctic through initiatives such as the
Arctic Council and the utilization of legal precedent of compulsory
conciliation on the delimitation of the continental shelf may render these two
legal-political equilibria sustainable in the long run, offering a novel
framework for the legal resolution of interstate conflicts.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: Arctic Ocean

Source: International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean, 2020.
Website: Map of Arctic Ocean, showing bathymetry and location of
subsurface features and seas. Modified from International Bathymeteric Chart
of the Arctic Ocean, courtesy of M. Jakobssen, Stockholm University,
(Jakobsson, M., Mayer, L.A., Bringensparr, C. et al. The International
Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean Version 4.0. Sci Data 7, 176
(2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-020-0520-9)
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Figure 2: Lomonosov Ridge

Source: Russian Geographical Society 2020.
Website:
https://www.rgo.ru/ru/article/hrebet-mendeleeva-imeetkontinentalnyy-fundament
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Figure 3: Russian Straight Baselines & the Northern Sea Route

Source: Lassere 2004: 410.
Website:
https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/cgq/2004-v48-n135cgq996/011799ar/
Lasserre, Frédéric « Les détroits arctiques canadiens et russes : souveraineté
et développement de nouvelles routes maritimes ». Cahiers de géographie du
Québec 48, no 135 (2004) : 397–425. https://doi.org/10.7202/011799ar==>
Sources: Cartes marines du Service hydrographique du Canada, 1972-1975;
Pharand, 1988; Dunlap, 1996; Mulherin, 1985.

